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Book Reviews
COUNTERINSURGENCY

Cassandra in Oz: Counterinsurgency and Future War
By Conrad C. Crane
Reviewed by Russell W. Glenn, Assistant G-2, Plans and Policy, Deputy
Chief of Staﬀ, G-2, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, and author
of Reconsidering Western Approaches to Counterinsurgency: Lessons from
Post-Colonial Conflict

S

ubtitle notwithstanding, military historian Conrad Crane’s Cassandra
in Oz: Counterinsurgency and Future War is less what he describes as
“a story about trying to influence large institutions to change, ideally
in the right direction for the right reasons,” than an autobiographical
excursion describing his role as member of the team tasked with
creating the December 2006 Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, and
his experiences during the months immediately following its publication.
Additionally—if secondarily—the book is a consideration of the publication’s impact on operations in Iraq. There is also a very brief synopsis
of US involvement in Afghanistan counterinsurgency (COIN) activities.
Despite the several foci, there are a number of worthy insights
provided vis-à-vis COIN operations in Iraq. These observations include
that all soldiers and marines are potentially intelligence collectors,
that better synchronization of special operations units’ activities with
conventional units’ activities remains a crying need even after more
than a decade’s presence in Iraq and Afghanistan, that trust between
representatives of an external coalition force and members of the host
nation population is fundamental to success, and that haste in holding
elections during a counterinsurgency is unwise, the last only too evident
in the often counterproductive behaviors of former Prime Minister
Nouri al-Maliki government in Baghdad. While few of these perceptions,
drawn from Crane’s personal experience and interviews in Iraq, will be
new to those familiar with the war, many are sufficiently valuable to bear
the repetition. Also notable in this regard is a point too infrequently
recognized, one no less valid as operations continue today: “The most
adept sociocultural briefings . . . came from soldiers and [m]arines who
had probably conducted enough field research . . . to earn a PhD back
at a civilian university.” In COIN, no less than other forms of confl ict,
the wisdom of the soldier is both invaluable and an ore too little mined.
Crane obviously took copious notes during his weeks as a member
of the FM 3-24 writing team and in-theater travels thereafter. His
frequent listing of partners in the undertaking and myriad others
attending conferences, working groups, or otherwise influencing
the doctrine’s creation and application in the field is impressive. The
cataloging makes it clear the manual was raised by a quite populous
village. Crane’s firsthand participation in this community, combined
with both his training and practice as a historian, undeniably makes him
an appropriate vehicle for the tale’s telling. There are times, however,
in which he seems a bit too willing to give credit to those closest to
him in the endeavor. One such participant is noted for his consistent
championing of the need for a counterinsurgency force to continue to
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learn and adapt. Such points unquestionably merit prominence in COIN
doctrine; however, essentiality of learning and adapting (and anticipation
as a third consideration) was adroitly presented 15 years previously
in Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War, a valuable book
coauthored by Eliot A. Cohen who was also among those influencing
the manual’s development. So too, the figure on page 88 depicting the
evolving emphasis a unit puts on mission type (denoting the relative
weights allotted offense, defense, and stability over time) initially
appeared in 2001 in Field Manual 3-0, Operations.
Cassandra in Oz: Counterinsurgency and Future War concludes with a
series of additional observations by the author that are certainly worthy
of attention. An appendix presents a “Mission Matrix for Iraq,” its list of
tasks providing further material of value to commanders and staffs who
may find COIN or nation-building responsibilities in their “missionset” during future contingencies. In sum, senior members of the defense
community and others seeking analysis of past counterinsurgencies in
the service of future field application will find pithier sources elsewhere.
Other readers looking for the history of the development of one of
America’s most influential and necessary doctrinal publications in recent
history will find that history here in admirable detail.

Forging the Sword: Doctrinal Change in the U.S. Army
By Benjamin M. Jensen
Reviewed by James H. Joyner Jr., Associate Professor of Strategic Studies, US
Marine Corps Command and Staﬀ College, and Nonresident Senior Fellow,
Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security at the Atlantic Council

O
Stanford, CA: Stanford
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rganizational change literature argues large bureaucracies tend
to remain in a state of inertia absent either catastrophic failure,
extreme pressure from external leadership, or strong fear of losing out
on resources to a competing bureaucracy. In Forging the Sword: Doctrinal
Changes in the U.S. Army, Benjamin M. Jensen demonstrates how these
explanations have not held true for the US Army, at least in the postVietnam period. Despite the popular perception of military brass as
“unimaginative bureaucrats trapped in an iron cage,” the Army has
repeatedly revised its capstone doctrine because visionary top-level
leadership continually assessed its “theory of victory” for fighting the
next war based on an evolving operational environment.
Through a series of case studies, Jensen concludes “doctrinal change
requires incubators, informal subunits established outside the hierarchy,
and advocacy networks championing new concepts that emerge from
incubators.” The former, he argues, are essential because professionals
“require safe spaces to visualize new forms of warfare.” The latter,
meanwhile, spread these new ideas within the community and help
socialize them and build “buy in.” While not a core argument of the
book, Jensen also refutes the myth on constant interservice rivalry,
pointing to several examples of seamless cooperation between the Army
and Air Force.
Since 1975, the Army has rewritten its capstone doctrinal
Field Manual 3-0, Operations, seven times. Jensen focuses on three
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of these revisions—the 1976 Active Defense, the 1982 AirLand
Battle, and the 1993 Full-Dimensional Operations concepts—
which represented a fundamental change in the Army’s “theory of
victory.” He also examines the bureaucratic struggle over the 2006
Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency.
In 1973, a series of events forced Army leaders to reorient the
institution. The end of conscription and the dawn of an all-volunteer
force fundamentally changed the composition of the US military. The
end of American combat operations in Vietnam meant a drawdown to
an Army with half the strength it had at the height of the confl ict. And,
the short Yom Kippur War demonstrated a radical change in the range,
accuracy, lethality, and logistical sustainment requirements of modern
tank warfare while highlighting a fundamental change in the role of
tactical airpower.
Into the breach stepped General William E. DePuy, who would
become the first head of the Training and Doctrine Command
(TRADOC) and personally oversee the rewriting of the operations
manual. He established a “boathouse gang” of senior leaders and
thinkers to write individual chapters and to serve as a “sounding board”
for new ideas, which were then field tested with corps-level exercises.
The group soon realized adequate close air support would only be
possible with air supremacy—which meant the Army would not only
need support from the Air Force but would also need to support the
Air Force in the early stages of confl ict to suppress enemy air defenses.
The resulting doctrine, dubbed Active Defense, radically changed the
Army theory of victory in Europe from one in which a trip-wire force
held off the Soviets until reinforcements could arrive to one of “winning
the first battle.” Throughout the development phase, DePuy personally
socialized the new findings to key stakeholders within the Army and
the Pentagon, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies, and
members of the think tank community.
Almost immediately after the Army adopted the Active Defense
doctrine, the Soviets changed their doctrine and command and control
capability and introduced modernized weapons. In response, the
Department of Defense devised an offset strategy to counter Soviet
numerical advantages with vastly improved command, control, and
precision technology. Additionally, the twin shocks of 1979—the
Iranian Revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan—led to
the Carter doctrine and a demand for the Army to be ready for lowintensity fights in addition to high-intensity maneuver warfare. General
Donn A. Starry, part of the boathouse gang who helped write the 1976
doctrine, succeeded DePuy at TRADOC and oversaw the 1982 manual
that introduced AirLand Battle in response to the new operating
environment. Like his predecessor, Starry networked the development
with key stakeholders, especially the Air Force, which was invited to
contribute during the development phase.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union and end of the Cold War in
1991, Army leadership was faced with a completely new landscape. Not
only would troop levels be cut to the lowest levels since 1939, but it
soon became apparent ground forces would be required to respond to
a much wider and more complex mission set without the advantage of
prepositioned forces and ready bases. Additionally, the Goldwater-Nichols
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Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 meant the services
had less autonomy in crafting their own doctrine. In response, Gordon
R. Sullivan, the Army Chief of Staff, personally pushed for reforms
toward his vision of a “post-industrial” force. Frederick M. Franks Jr., the
new TRADOC commander, used the Army’s branch schools as “battle
labs” to incubate new ideas and mimicked the Louisiana Maneuvers of
the 1940s as a testing ground. This resulted in the publication of the
full-spectrum dimensional operations doctrine in 1994 that outlined
the Army’s vision for being able to win two nearly simultaneous major
theater wars while also being engaged in all manner of small wars and
operations other than war lower on the spectrum. As in the previous
examples, stakeholders inside and outside the Army were courted
throughout the process for their input and buy in, and the doctrine was
developed in parallel with Air Force doctrinal revisions.
The writing of the 2006 counterinsurgency manual is different from
the other cases. Rather than a new overall theory of war for the Army,
it was a new theory of victory for a particular fight. Further, as Jensen
notes, the actual change was “much less than heralded at the time.” Still,
it was an important example of doctrinal change, coming in the midst of
America’s largest confl ict since Vietnam. Unlike the previous examples,
this was neither top-down nor even Army-centric. Army Lieutenant
General David Petraeus and Marine Corps Lieutenant General James
Mattis led the project and recruited a brain trust of midlevel leaders from
their services and a handful of outside experts from the “COINdinista”
camp. Capitalizing on the star power of the two leaders, the team
engaged in a months-long media blitz spreading their ideas through a
series of speeches and within professional and policy journals.
Jensen notes the successful examples discussed in Forging the
Sword: Doctrinal Change in the U.S. Army were driven by thoughtful
professionals who worked in small groups—not drained of creativity by
gigantic staffs. To that end, Jensen concludes with a plea for continued
emphasis on education, testing new ideas in war games and writing in
professional journals, and encouragement of constant challenging of the
status quo.

“Soft” Counterinsurgency: Human Terrain Teams and
US Military Strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan
By Paul Joseph
Reviewed by Michael C. Davies, coauthor of Human Terrain Teams: An
Organizational Innovation for Sociocultural Knowledge in Irregular Warfare

New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2014
110 pages
$49.99

T

he now-defunct Human Terrain System (HTS) was developed to
improve the military decision-making process by facilitating a better
understanding of the local population—the human terrain. The program
garnered significant press attention, suffered from internal disquiet, and
was the focus of numerous denunciations. Paul Joseph, professor of
sociology at Tufts University, was one of the first external reviewers of
the program. He gained insider access during the program’s early days,
and “Soft” Counterinsurgency is the outcome of the time he spent with
program participants.
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Joseph’s work centers on the narratives that defined the program at
its beginning and questioned whether it could be considered effective.
He excels at answering this question. Based on interviews with 30
individuals as well as a large-group session of 20 more participants,
Joseph tackles the key debates and concerns of the program from the
perspectives of the participants—something distinctly lacking in all but
a few works on HTS—while adding his expert analysis to each issue.
The book assesses five major topics, from the program’s history
and structure to its impact on military commanders, how success can
be defined and claimed, the program’s effect on operations, and the
relationship between HTS and the broader US strategy in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Joseph is blunt in his conclusion on whether HTS achieved
its stated objective of altering military perceptions of the battle space
and transforming operational outcomes: “No, it did not.”
Like the assessments on HTS, Joseph outlines relevant examples of
Human Terrain Teams (HTTs) embedded in combat units who provided
soldiers and commanders with quality assessments of the human terrain.
In providing a full account of the words of team members, Joseph shows
the limited impact achieved; that while HTTs provided, “a generally
accurate assessment of the situation [they] did not contribute to a needed
revision” of US strategy in terms of goals, execution, or resources, let
alone all three iteratively. This is the unique contribution Joseph brings
to the literature on HTS.
The “cultural turn” and HTS may have correctly seen sociocultural
awareness as the necessary first step to effective strategy and eventual
victory. However, it is political governance, both emergent and
institutional, from the local through the national levels, that is at the
core of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Because this issue was ignored,
pushed aside, or overwhelmed by other factors, victory remained
fleeting, if impossible from the start. The quality and quantity of the
human terrain assessments could therefore only be effective up to a
certain point.
Joseph is not the first to recognize this problem, but he fails to
tap into other researchers who support his reasoning. As “Soft”
Counterinsurgency is a slim volume, adding the works of Jenkins, Komer,
Krepinevich, the Project for National Security Reform, and others, all
of whom have made the same conclusions about how elements of the US
government operate on the battlefield, would have brought additional
weight to Joseph’s argument.
Nevertheless, Joseph shines a light on the other side of the strategy
bridge. He asks the question: if war is the continuation of politics, and
politics at the ground level is never considered in strategic interaction,
why should we be surprised when defeat occurs? He concludes the
United States consistently fails to link the two sides through effective
and sustainable governance built on an understanding of local politics.
And this failure is the core reason the United States lost the wars in Iraq
and Afghanistan—and other operations. It is also why the United States
has learned little from these failures.
“Soft” Counterinsurgency offers an incisive view into one of the most
publicized programs from the 9/11 era. In attempting to answer the
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question, however imperfectly, of why the United States has struggled
so much in the wars that followed, Joseph’s conclusion—that strategic
interaction between ground truth, operational concepts, and political
goals has been unbridgeable from the beginning—should give all civilian
and military senior leaders pause.

War Comes to Garmser: Thirty Years of
Conflict on the Afghan Frontier
By Carter Malkasian
Reviewed by M. Chris Mason, Professor of National Security Aﬀairs, US Army
War College. Dr. Mason was the State Department political oﬃcer in the
Paktika Province of Afghanistan in 2005.

New York: Oxford
University Press, 2016
329 pages
$21.95

C

arter Malkasian purposefully and successfully styles War Comes to
Garmser after Jeffrey Race’s War Comes to Long An (1972), a classic
in the academic literature of Vietnam. Like Race’s book, which tells the
story of the struggle for control of one district in Vietnam between the
end of the French war and the beginning of the American war, War
Comes to Garmser chronicles the local politics and the battle for control of
the Garmser District in the Helmand Province of Afghanistan.
For those not familiar with Malkasian, he began his unlikely path
to the Garmser District with a doctorate in history from Oxford and a
position as professor of military history at Loyola Marymount University,
but a relative, who served as a Navy medical officer in Vietnam with
1st Battalion 9th Marines (The Walking Dead), persuaded Malkasian
he needed to experience war personally if he was going to write about
it. So Malkasian took a job as a State Department contractor, working
first in the Kunar Province of Afghanistan and then the Anbar Province
of Iraq. He agreed to go back to Afghanistan only if he could go to a
hot spot. Sent to work in the Helmand Province’s violent Garmser
District, he got his wish. His success in pacifying the local political
situation there and shaping a local, indigenous resistance to the Taliban
between 2009–11 brought him national attention and resulted in War
Comes to Garmser.
True to his inspiration, Malkasian’s book succeeds and remains
timeless for much the same reason War Comes to Long An does: Malkasian
never tries to do too much. He remains focused on the confl ict in his
district, telling the story of the Garmser District over some 30 years,
and he avoids offering advice or the bromides about the larger confl ict
that often litter other books about Afghanistan written from a single
perspective. Instead, Malkasian does a fine job of recording the history of
the Garmser District, from the large-scale US Agency for International
Development (USAID) irrigation and agricultural development projects
of the 1950s up to 2011, when he left the district. A postscript to this
paperback edition brings the story of Garmser up to 2015.
As few Americans ever could, or even attempted to do, Malkasian
understood the tangled, ever-shifting web of social confl icts in Garmser,
which pitted rival tribes against one another, indigenous landed farmers
against recently arrived squatters, and local strongmen against religious
leaders, and he explains them in a way that is accessible even to readers
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unfamiliar with Afghanistan. What emerges is strong evidence that at
the district level, as was the case in Long An, resistance to the Taliban
and the Viet Cong was a local, personal matter, driven by family feuds,
tribal politics, land disputes, and village political economies. Malkasian
and Race show clearly that in both wars, local resistance to guerillas
in remote districts was devoid of any notion of support for predatory
and corrupt national governments in capital cities—or even provincial
capitals—which were so removed from local lives they might as well
have been on the moon. Whether intentionally or not, in so doing
they debunk the great fallacy of counterinsurgency theory—the idea
that such isolated “ink spots” of resistance can somehow be linked up
and transmogrified into a pan-national movement in support of an
illegitimate government in time of terrible local violence in primitive,
deeply fractured tribal societies with no conception of national identity.
Indeed, no counterinsurgency in modern history has succeeded where
there was no pervasive, preexisting sense of national identity and where
the national government was not seen as legitimate by the great majority
of its citizens. Empirical data also shows no government has ever seen
its popular support increase during an insurgency or civil war.
Other lessons from War Comes to Garmser are less obvious. While
many men might have written a book about Vietnam like War Comes to
Long An, probably only Malkasian could have written this companion
volume about the war in Afghanistan. Malkasian’s success in Garmser
was almost unique: no other State Department official or military officer
anywhere else in the Pashto-speaking south and east of the country
(where until recently the conflict was largely confined) achieved anything
like what was accomplished in Garmser. The reason for this, which
undermined the US effort in the country, was simple: while overall US
involvement in Afghanistan closely mirrored the effort in Vietnam in
virtually every other respect, there was one critical difference.
During the 12 years of the Vietnam War from 1960 to 1972, the
United States trained tens of thousands of American military and civilian
personnel to functional fluency in Vietnamese. In the 16 years of the
Afghanistan conflict, the United States trained less than 50 to functional
fluency in Pashto, with most of them assigned to Kabul. With admirable
determination, Malkasian taught himself Pashto, and as the Washington
Post noted in 2011, his ability to communicate effectively and directly with
the elders and other local leaders in Garmser made his success possible.
Virtually everywhere else in the Pashtun south and east, US personnel
relied on the disastrously ineffective, unreliable, and indirect method
of interpreters, very few of whom were native Pashtuns and a majority
of whom had, at best, a questionable grip on the nuances of a language
which relies heavily on parables, folk sayings, and other culturally derived
idioms. This practice made impactful personal relationships, trust, and
even meaningful conversations between Americans and Pashtuns all
but impossible. In no small part, the US war in Afghanistan was lost
in translation.
Twice in 50 years, the United States took sides in a civil war in Asia,
occupied a country with large numbers of troops, imposed a culturally
illegitimate form of government on an illiterate peasantry, manipulated
elections, glossed over fraudulent outcomes, and propped up deeply
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unpopular governments riddled with drug lords. In both Vietnam
and Afghanistan, the US government misunderstood an elusive and
dedicated enemy, mistrusted a national army it created in its own
image (which was decimated by desertions and lacked the will to fight
for kleptocratic elites in a distant capital), and thought that somehow all
these issues could be overcome with superior firepower and slapdash
rural development.
The irony of War Comes to Garmser is that Malkasian successfully
crafts his book as a companion volume to War Comes to Long An, but
apparently he never saw the Afghan War itself as a reboot of the Vietnam
War and missed Race’s central lesson: the Vietminh understood the
war was about imposing social order from the bottom up, and military
confl ict was secondary. As one former Vietminh cadre tells Race in War
Comes to Long An: “You have the central government, then the province,
district, and village. But the lowest of the four is the level that lies with
the people. If the village level is weak, then I guarantee you, no matter
how strong the central government is, it won’t be able to do a thing.”
The United States spent the entire war in Afghanistan trying to build
up the national, provincial, and district governments, while the Taliban
controlled the villages and imposed an acceptable social order. Garmser
is back under Taliban control.

FOREIGN POLICY AND NATIONAL SECURITY

Mission Failure: America and the World
in the Post-Cold War Era
by Michael Mandelbaum
Reviewed by COL Michael Dhunjishah, US Army War College Student

H
New York: Oxford
University Press, 2016
504 pages
$29.95

aving attended Yale University at the same time as President
George W. Bush and having known President Bill Clinton from
Oxford, Michael Mandelbaum wanted to examine what went wrong with
US foreign policy when his generation was put in charge. It was the end
of the Cold War and the United States was the most powerful nation
in the world, but all that power did not necessarily equate to the United
States being able to remake the world in its image. Why?
In his most recent book, Mission Failure: America and the World in
the Post-Cold War Era, Mandelbaum lays out a convincing argument
explaining how, even with the best of intentions, US foreign policy
failed to produce the more democratic and peaceful post-Cold War
world everyone expected. He contends that after the Cold War the
United States shifted towards acting more on its values than its
interests, and by doing so became focused on putting countries “on the
road to Denmark,” moving them to a more liberal, democratic system.
The failure, however, to realize the enormity of the task resulted in the
United States getting bogged down in nation- and state-building—
which, as always, are inherently difficult.
Throughout the book, Mandelbaum does an excellent job of
looking at all angles of these complex problems. As an example, he is
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quick to refute criticism placed on L. Paul Bremer III for the failure of
postinvasion Iraq, namely de-Baathification and disbanding of the Iraqi
military. Mandelbaum emphasizes that no one really knows what would
have happened if the Baathists remained in charge of Iraq after the
invasion or if Bremer had left the Iraqi army in place. He does, however,
explain Bremer’s logic in making these decisions and argues that keeping
both oppressive institutions in place might have exacerbated issues
with the Shia population and the Kurds. Although this is counter to
conventional wisdom, Mandelbaum is not afraid to look at these issues
from all points of view and provide more mature, seasoned analysis of
causes and effects.
Additionally, Mandelbaum is not afraid to call it like he sees
it. Although he worked on Clinton’s first campaign for president,
Mandelbaum provides a reasonably objective view of foreign policy
decisions regardless of party affi liation or his personal ties with those
in power. He finds fault with the foreign policy of Presidents Clinton
and Barack Obama, just as easily as he does with President Bush. In
today’s supercharged environment of political partisanship, this book
focuses more on what went wrong rather than blaming one party
or the other. This refreshing take allows readers to understand how
and why the United States got into problems in Somalia, the Balkans,
Afghanistan, and Iraq over the past 25 years. Mandelbaum walks readers
down the decision-making path of these leaders who, despite their best
intentions, for one reason or another, ended up leading the country into
situations where the United States failed to meet its stated objectives.
One of the strengths of the book is also one of its weaknesses.
Focusing on the last 25 years, many of the endeavors covered are still
ongoing or have recently ended. The benefit of this is that the book
serves as an initial compilation of strategic lessons learned or a “history
hot wash,” providing current foreign policy practitioners valuable
insights that may help shape future decisions. Because this is a first draft
of history, hower, there are many aspects to these relationships, events,
and long-term consequences that are unknown at this time. As with
any historical event, a more complete understanding does not manifest
itself until well after the events have taken place (typically after decades).
Nevertheless, Mission Failure provides a necessary historical overview
on issues currently facing the United States, thereby offering current
foreign policy practitioners and strategic leaders much-needed analysis
and perspective that might help them avoid making the same mistakes
in the future.
Finally, Mandelbaum hangs a little too much on the decision to
expand the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). His assertion
that the United States now faces a Russia that is hostile to the West due
to the expansion of NATO in the 1990s may eventually prove to be
correct, but placing all, or at least the majority, of the blame for the poor
state of US-Russia relations today on the expansion of NATO seems
myopic. Although it can be argued that the expansion of NATO led to
some of the issues between the two countries, the US relationship with
Russia is more complex and placing blame on one particular action is
problematic. Just as Mandelbaum is quick to question blaming Bremer
for all the failures in Iraq, it is shortsighted to blame all the failures of
US-Russia relations on the decision to expand NATO.
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Overall, Mission Failure is a terrific book that holds value for foreign
policy students, strategic leaders, and casual readers. Mandelbaum’s style
allows readers from all backgrounds to understand the intricacies of US
foreign policy as it played out in the post-Cold War era. His clear prose,
strong research, logical organization, and well-reasoned arguments keep
readers engaged throughout the book. Mission Failure should be required
reading for every military strategic leader and foreign policy practitioner.

A World in Disarray: American Foreign Policy
and the Crisis of the Old Order
By Richard Haass
Reviewed by W. Andrew Terrill, Professor Emeritus, US Army War College

A
New York: Penguin Press,
2017
339 pages
$28.00

World in Disarray is an examination of the changing international
system and the implications of these changes for US foreign
policy. In considering these issues, Richard Haass begins with a general
overview of international relations from the mid-seventeenth century
until contemporary times. He then provides brief reflections and
recommendations on many current global issues and emerging crises.
According to Haass, new and complex global dilemmas have raised the
possibility that one historical era is ending and another beginning. In this
evolving environment, new ways of thinking will be required to deal with
challenges such as climate change, the regulation of cyberspace, and the
possible rise of pandemic diseases that may kill millions.
Unfortunately, Haass also sees a simultaneous rise in world
disorder, whereby the level of international cooperation needed to
overcome these problems has eroded. He suggests the United Kingdom’s
planned withdrawal from the European Union (EU) could lead to the
breakup of the country and a partial unraveling of the EU. He further
points out that the post-World War I order is unraveling in significant
areas within the Middle East leading to huge problems with instability
in this part of the world. Complicating everything, the US share of
global power is shrinking and being partially redistributed into more
hands including both state and nonstate entities. Thus, in Haass’s view,
multilateral cooperation with a variety of countries and nonsovereign
international entities has become more essential than ever.
Haass states that no global orders can be automatic or self-sustaining
even when they serve the interests of a variety of countries that should
rationally seek to bolster such orders but do not always do so. To deal
with current and future problems in a more multilateral way, Haass puts
forward a concept he calls sovereign obligation, which he claims is an
updating of political realism. This set of ideas stresses governmental
obligations to work together with other countries to manage global
problems including slow-motion crises such as climate change and
potentially lightning-fast catastrophes such as pandemic disease, all of
which call for strong international agreements negotiated in advance.
Sovereign obligation would also call upon countries to work with other
nations to solve domestic problems (such as the rise of international
terrorist groups in their ungoverned spaces) that have important
international implications. Beyond multilateralism among states, Haass
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believes there is a vital, positive international role for nonsovereign
international entities such as multinational corporations, charities such
as the Gates Foundation, and nongovernmental organizations such as
Doctors Without Borders (255). According to Haass, an international
system can only become an international society when the latter reflects
a degree of buy in on the part of the participants including states and
important international nonstate entities.
Having identified multilateralism as an important part of the
solution for global problems, Haass notes the need for the United States
to maintain acceptable relations with other major countries that could
serve as partners in addressing some issues, while inevitably remaining
rivals on others. In this regard, Haass believes China and the United
States have managed to maintain a mostly mutual beneficial relationship,
albeit with some deterioration of friendly ties during recent years over
issues such as the South China Sea. He also states the United States
should have done more to help the Soviet Union, and then Russia,
make the transition from a controlled political and economic system
to a more democratic political structure and a market economy. Haass
further believes the United States supported rapid and provocative
North Atlantic Treaty Organization expansion, and this process now
needs to be paused to help prevent further damage to US-Russian
relations. According to Haass, the central challenge for the United States
in shaping relations with both China and Russia is to discourage bad
behavior in a way that does not preclude selective and valuable cooperation
on global and regional challenges.
Haass states Iran’s Islamic Republic is now approaching four decades
in age and can therefore be considered politically secure. This statement
is true enough to serve as a basis for strategic planning, but he also
views Iran with a great deal of concern. In particular, Haass expresses
reservations about the Iranian nuclear agreement with the United States
and its negotiating partners and maintains the Obama administration,
“committed the cardinal negotiating sin wanting an agreement too
much and therefore compromising too much” (133). He also takes an
extremely hard line on the 2013 crisis with Syria, in which President
Obama withdrew a previous threat (a so-called redline) to bomb Assad
regime military forces and infrastructure following the regime’s use of
chemical weapons against Syrian civilians. Instead, the administration
chose a policy of restraint in exchange for the verifiable destruction of
most of Assad’s chemical weapons and the infrastructure for synthesizing,
maintaining, and storing them. Often, when a country obtains its
objectives through diplomacy rather than violence, this result is viewed
as both a victory and an act of political maturity, but Haass dismisses the
Syrian surrender of such formidable capabilities as “a plus” but certainly
not a major factor justifying the decision. This evaluation is surely his
only step toward a dogmatic form of conservatism in a study that is
otherwise characterized by national interest-based pragmatism.
In summary, A World in Disarray: American Foreign Policy and the Crisis
of the Old Order stands as a collection of the author’s insights, opinions,
and perhaps prejudices. As a kaleidoscopic introduction to global
issues, the book certainly has potential value for students, and more
seasoned scholars may find many of the ideas presented well worth their
consideration. The central concept of sovereign obligation is hardly
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unknown even if Haass has developed a new phrase to describe it, but
his efforts to add some nuance to the concept are clearly useful. Thus,
the work is a rational, reflective, and useful look at global problems and
the US place in dealing with these problems as part of a wider world.

GRAND STRATEGY

American Power & Liberal Order: A Conservative
Internationalist Grand Strategy
By Paul D. Miller
Reviewed by Lukas Milevski, Lecturer, University of Leiden
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$32.95

ver since the end of the Cold War, grand strategy has become a
fixation among academics writing about American foreign policy
and international relations. With the successful conclusion of containment, many believed the United States required a new guiding idea to
lead it through a changed world. This thought triggered a sustained
debate throughout the 1990s, which abated only slightly during the
Global War on Terror, and which has returned with a vengeance in the
past decade. Paul Miller, currently associate director of the Clements
Center for National Security at the University of Texas at Austin, but
once an actor within the actual national security apparatus, including the
National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency, has now
waded into this unending debate with his newest book American Power &
Liberal Order. The book is aimed primarily, but not exclusively, at national
security professionals and real policymakers.
Miller’s main argument is the United States should not step away
from the world, as advocates of restraint or offshore balancing would
ask. But rather, the United States should maintain active engagement
to sustain the extant liberal order. To support this basic thesis, Miller
relies on a number of interrelated historical and theoretical arguments.
The main theoretical argument is American power and liberal order are
mutually reinforcing—American power sustains the liberal order, but
the liberal order, in turn, contributes to the sustenance of American
power and security. The prime historical argument is American power
and realism in foreign affairs, along with liberal order abroad, have been
the twin driving forces in American foreign affairs for more than a
century. In other words, American policymakers have long recognized
the relationship between American power and the liberal order and
have sought to protect and increase the latter, often, if not usually, with
beneficial results for both.
The theoretical and historical relationship between American
power and international liberal order is well argued. But it forms only
the foundation upon which the true purpose of the book is built. Miller
(deservedly) proudly notes one major distinction between his book and
those of most other academics is that he tackles the fundamental hard
question which separates a workable policy from an unworkable one—
implementation. How could a grand strategy focusing on maintaining
liberal order be implemented in practice? Miller argues against mainstream
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opinion in suggesting counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and stability
operations have important roles to play in such a grand strategy.
Miller recognizes selectivity in intervention is vital; he bases his
criteria on global power distribution, which is made up of three factors—
gross domestic product, material capabilities, and military spending. He
posits that it is worth intervening to shore up or install liberal order in
states which represent substantial contributions to the aggregate power
of democratic and liberal states in the world. For example, Somalia is
out, but for a number of reasons Afghanistan remains an important front
line. Miller examines every major region in the world, identifying certain
countries as being potential opportunities and others as being overly
troublesome spots not worth the effort required to transform them.
Miller also considers his proposed grand strategy from the instrumental
perspective, discussing in his final section various instruments of
national power and the vital role each has to play in implementation.
Miller has produced a thoughtful work on American power and
liberal order, complete with an initial discussion on how to implement
his preferred grand strategy (and he is emphatic it is only the starting
point for sustained serious thinking). It is, of course, entirely arguable.
His theoretical and historical chapters are largely convincing and
thought-provoking. But once he turns to implementation further
assumptions seep into his argument. He wholly accepts the veracity
of democratic peace theory and implicitly suggests democracy is the
most important factor in any international relationship—above history,
culture, and so forth. The democracies aggregate into one international
camp, and authoritarian regimes similarly form the opposing side. One
might wonder how India’s great power aspirations fit within this picture.
Miller’s vision of implementation is bound to be contentious, but this
is no surprise. Implementation is usually the most controversial aspect
of any policy, as it is in the details that policies are made or broken and
real-world consequences occur.
American Power & Liberal Order: A Conservative Internationalist Grand
Strateg y will hopefully spark debate—both academic and official—
on the future direction of American grand strategy and, with its
emphasis also on the difficult questions of implementation, may set a
new standard for this particular genre of academic textual endeavor. It
is a book very much worth a read; in agreement or disagreement, it will
provoke thought.

The Spartan Regime: Its Character,
Origins, and Grand Strategy
By Paul A. Rahe
Reviewed by LTC Jason W. Warren, Concepts and Doctrine Director, Center for
Strategic Leadership, US Army War College

P

aul A. Rahe’s account of the Spartan regime of the late archaic and
early classical periods demonstrates how the peculiar social mores
and resulting political values of this polis underpinned Lacedaemon’s
strategic efficacy during its long Peloponnesian hegemony. Unlike
his previous Grand Strategy of Classical Sparta, which I reviewed in this
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journal, Rahe’s new volume is an eminently readable, well presented, and
pithy affair, coming in around 124 pages of text. Relying on a host of
primary and secondary sources, Rahe succeeds in elucidating the social
and cultural backbone of what he considers a Spartan “grand strategy.”
Rahe repackages through the lens of political analysis Spartan-enforced
social cohesion in what would otherwise be well-tread intellectual
ground covered by the likes of Paul Cartledge, Stephen Hodkinson, and
N. M. Kennell. The strength of this volume also results in its weaknesses,
however, as some of the material in The Spartan Regime: Its Character,
Origins, and Grand Strategy is overly anachronistic, while digressions into the
fog of the eighth and early seventh centuries (BC) serve as a distraction.
Successfully avoiding the pitfall of presenting yet another account
on Spartan peculiarities, Rahe frames his discussion in a “political
science” and intellectual history framework. He considers this method
a lost political science of earlier eras, focusing more on human nature
and its limitations in producing sound leaders and political stability than
current theory. There are frequent allusions to classical philosophers
like Plato and Aristotle, the latter of whom comes in for favorable
commentary, and whose ideas Rahe especially utilizes as a vehicle for
his analysis. Rahe also projects back into time the thinking of
Enlightenment philosophes and early American political leaders to help
explain the checks and balances inherent in the Spartan regime, but also
how Lacedaemon differed from other such mixed-governments. This
setting uniquely places this volume apart.
Reaching forward to analyze backwards is not without literary risks,
however, and some of Rahe’s examples are unhelpful anachronisms. For
example, interjections such as “At least while the Atlantic and Pacific
oceans sufficed to isolate and protect it, the liberal republic established
by the American Founding Fathers could almost do without men of
a warlike demeanor” (40). This would be news to Parameters readers,
given an armed entity known as the US Army has existed since 1775
and before as colonial militias, and has fought in every decade since
the American Revolutionary War. There is nothing added with these
comparisons, opening the text to criticism and detracting from a focus
best left to earlier times. The same can be said about the idea of a “grand
strategy,” which in its current connotation anticipates a settled nationstate capable of projecting worldwide economic, diplomatic, cultural,
and military power, something the confines of Sparta’s 3,300 squaremile holdings could never approximate (93). Sparta’s strategy was not
grand, but insular, and perhaps the concept of a “strategic culture”
would have better served Rahe’s purposes.
Rahe begins by describing the paideia or, as he defines it, the
“education and moral formation [of the community] in the broadest and
most comprehensive sense” (xiv). He then analyzes the unique Spartan
institutions, laws, and constitution which together formed its politeia.
This is a rational and beneficial way of beginning the discussion on
the cultural factors that ultimately underlay the author’s portrayal of a
Spartan “grand strategy.” He then sets about detailing his conception of
nomadic groups of ethnic Dorians, which invaded the Peloponnese in
the Greek dark ages after the collapse of Mycenaean civilization. Rahe
lingers a bit too long here, attempting to piece together controversial
and sparse evidence into a coherent picture that is simply very difficult
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to establish. He could have better utilized this text space to demonstrate
a firmer link between Sparta’s social institutions and its supposed
“grand strategy,” the latter of which he does not come around to until
later in the book and then only again in the conclusion (105). Further
consideration of the structural shortcomings of property consolidation
resulting from a slackening pure-Spartan population and aristocratic
land grabbing would have proven more useful.
The book’s coverage of Sparta’s servile system as the foundational
element of its strategy and alliance is quite worthwhile. Particularly
enlightening is Rahe’s focus on the Spartan’s subjugation and
enslaving of the neighboring Messenians and the formation of the
“Spartan Alliance,” later expanded to the Peloponnesian League that
would face down Persia and the Delian League alike (106–20). For
it was the serfdom of the Messenians, predicated on Lacedaemon’s
earlier treatment of the Helots, which advanced a Spartiate class that
constantly prepared for war. Not having to concern itself with farming
for sustenance, Sparta concentrated on its army. Pure-born Spartan men
were cast into barracks at the tender age of seven and not allowed to leave
their particular cohort of comrades, if they survived, until military
retirement at 45 (interestingly not far off a current 20-year Army
retirement once the “cadet” Spartiates achieved full status around age
20). Rahe implies this focus on war was a result of military defeats such as
the so-called Battles of the Hysiae and the Fetters against neighboring
poleis in the first half of the seventh century. Thus, Sparta’s grand
strategy as the polis rose in fame and power rested on the backs of
oppressed peoples, while even posturing as a champion of liberty
among tyrants and seemingly without irony given the servile system,
which allowed this very championing. This necessitated keeping the
slaves down and the warlike Argives of the northeastern Peloponnese
out, often with the help of allies—the original members of the
Peloponnesian League.
The Spartan Regime will be of interest to classical scholars and readers
motivated by comparing a classical notion of political philosophy to the
Spartan regimes of the archaic and classical eras. The volume is replete
with excellent maps, which will help readers in this endeavor. The idea
of establishing a political framework for “grand strategy” based on social
and cultural bedrocks is an extremely useful concept at a time when
American and Western societies are generally disengaged with wars
around the globe fought on its behalf. Rahe’s piece serves as a useful
reminder, and perhaps a warning, that this current order of events is not
as it should be, and that even when cultural and military values align for
sound strategy, a nation-state is still at risk for defeat and subjugation.
Sparta learned this in the first third of the fourth century at the hands
of Epaminondas’ Thebans, and later, Philip II of Macedon.
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Air Power: A Global History
By Jeremy Black
Reviewed by Conrad C. Crane, Chief of Historical Services, US Army Heritage
and Education Center, and author of multiple books on airpower history
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eremy Black, professor of history at the University of Exeter, is the
most prolific writer of military history today. He seems to publish a
new book every few months. Air Power: A Global History is typical of
his products, another well-written summary of a broad topic. Readers
are undoubtedly aware of the phrase “a mile wide and an inch deep,”
and this work begins a kilometer wide and a centimeter deep, until Black
gets to the Cold War about halfway through. From that point on, except
for sparse coverage of the Korean War, the narrative is richer and more
comprehensive, and fully as global as the title implies.
Air Power is a book about technology and events, not people or
theories. Black deals with the famous aces of World War I in one
sentence, while providing a detailed analysis of the British development
of superior synchronizing gears to fire through propellers—an advantage
over the Germans the Royal Air Force was able to maintain into World
War II. Few notable air leaders appear, and rarely do any theorists get
more than passing mention. Only John Warden merits a more lengthy
discussion, but even that is incomplete. Black, however, does much better
in his descriptions of the evolution of aircraft. He is obviously a big fan
of the B-52, and a strong critic of the F-35, which he argues “may prove
to be an expense too far and an entirely unnecessary system” (289). He
favors specialized airplanes over multipurpose models, a course difficult
to pursue in times of tight defense budgets.
Black acknowledges the United States has made a unique commitment
to airpower, and that it is “part and parcel of the American identity” (8).
But, he never deals with the intellectual roots of the military application
of US airpower developed in the interwar years, and except for some
vague references to the influence of California, never covers commercial
or civil aspects of aviation at all. One cannot understand American airmindedness without analyzing that aspect of airpower, the most glaring
deficiency of the book. In contrast, Black’s coverage of Eurasian military
developments is very thorough, including Japan and China. He also does
well with naval airpower and discusses advances in air defenses, missiles,
and unmanned systems.
Throughout the book, Black maintains a skeptical tone about
the independent strategic accomplishments of airpower, emphasizing
instead its essential importance as part of a joint force. He argues that
Western airpower today is in a state of crisis. Air forces are very expensive
and hard to justify against other competing social and political agendas,
while international competitors are also building cutting-edge aircraft.
Airpower also seems less relevant against enemies pursuing irregular
warfare amidst populations, and other services seem better suited for
counterterrorism or counterinsurgency.
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Air Power: A Global History will be most useful for readers new to the
topic who are looking for a beginning overview. More knowledgeable
readers will still find much of interest, but they will also be more
cognizant of what has been left out.

Victory Was beyond Their Grasp: With the
272nd Volks-Grenadier Division from the
Hürtgen Forest to the Heart of the Reich
By Douglas E. Nash
Reviewed by Richard L. Dinardo, Professor of National Security Aﬀairs, US
Marine Corps Command and Staﬀ College

W

hen it comes to studying the German army of World War II, one
notes that there are gaps in the record. These gaps get bigger
the lower one goes in the military hierarchy, and one can see this at The
National Archives at College Park, Maryland. The German records on
microfilm there are extensive for the Wehrmacht high command and
the army high command. The same can be said for army groups, armies,
and corps. Records for divisions get spotty. There are, for example, no
extant records for the 352nd Infantry Division for June 1944. Below
that, records are almost nonexistent. One might find regimental reports
occasionally nested within division records, but that is about it.
In 1994, Douglas Nash, a retired army officer who now works for
the Marine Corps History Division at Quantico, Virginia, acquired a
suitcase with a most interesting set of contents—the records of the 272nd
Fusilier Company, part of the 272nd Volks-Grenadier Division. Once
armed with these records, Nash very carefully supplemented this source
with other German records from College Park and the BundesarchivMilitärarchiv in Freiburg im Breisgau, Germany, the captured German
officer manuscript series, extensive American records of the units facing
the 272nd Volks-Grenadier Division, and the secondary literature. The
result is the fascinating study provided in Victory Was beyond Their Grasp:
With the 272nd Volks-Grenadier Division from the Hürtgen Forest to the Heart
of the Reich.
Nash provides extensive background on the creation of the 272nd
Volks-Grenadier Division. Its immediate antecedent, the 272nd
Infantry Division, had been badly mauled in Normandy. Enough of the
division had survived, however, so it could be reconstituted, though
this involved drawing elements from other divisions that had been too
severely damaged to reconstitute. With the old territorial system of
generating replacements destroyed, the new creation had to incorporate
replacements drawn from excess Luftwaffe and navy personnel. Nash
also presents detailed analysis of the volks-grenadier division as an
organization. The new division’s slightly smaller size in relation to
the older infantry division was offset by improvements in firepower,
particularly in the infantry elements.
Nash then follows the division from its initial commitment in
the latter stages of the fighting in the Hürtgen Forest to the division’s
surrender in the Ruhr Pocket, while some elements were able to retreat
to the Harz Mountains before surrendering. A trained field grade officer
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with long service, Nash has an excellent eye for tactical situations and
the ability to describe and analyze them clearly. His analysis, spread
throughout the book, would have benefited from a short concluding
chapter offering broader conclusions about the volks-grenadier division
within the broader context of the German army.
Given the volks-grenadier division was created largely for defensive
purposes, having the records of the 272nd Fusilier Company was a major
asset to Nash’s research, as the company was the division’s counterattack
unit, in effect its fire brigade, and fortunate to have a cadre of officers
and noncommissioned officers who were able and experienced. Nash’s
description of events illustrates the combat philosophy of the German
army that the outcome of tactical battles often depended upon the
actions of one or two individuals. Thus, having an experienced officer
or noncommissioned officer was critical to maintaining the combat
effectiveness of a company. Nash also decribes clearly the situation of
the German army in the west in late 1944 in ways one does not always
consider. While it was well known the German army was short of
artillery ammunition, the army also experienced a shortage of small
arms ammunition, especially for some of the more modern weapons
fielded by the German army, such as the MP44.
One negative aspect of Nash’s book is due to a factor beyond his
control. The 272nd Volks-Grenadier Division played a relatively minor
role in the campaign. The unit was scheduled to play a role in the
forthcoming Ardennes offensive, but instead got sucked into the fighting
in the Hürtgen Forest, where a temporary commitment became a longterm one. The story of the 272nd Volks-Grenadier Division, nonetheless,
is an excellent illustration of how the enemy often gets a vote in the
planning and conduct of operations.
To be sure, Nash does assume readers are familiar with the course
of the 1944 campaign in the west; however, novices will benefit from
his knowledge of the German army, its men, and its equipment at that
stage of the war. For students of the German army in World War II, as
well as students interested in the late 1944 campaign, Victory Was beyond
Their Grasp is a must read.

The Great War & the Middle East: A Strategic Study
By Rob Johnson
Reviewed by Michael S. Neiberg, Chair of War Studies and Professor of
History, US Army War College
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ob Johnson, in The Great War & the Middle East: A Strategic Study,
challenges the conventional notion that great power meddling in
the Middle East during World War I left poisonous legacies from which
the region still struggles to recover. That history, or at least the version
common in much of Europe and the Middle East today, posits that the
British in particular, while trying to find local allies to help dismember the
Ottoman Empire, made contradictory and dishonest promises to mutually contentious groups. These deals included the Sykes-Picot Agreement
(1916) that carved much of the Middle East into French and British
spheres of influence, the Husayn-McMahon correspondence (1915) that
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promised the Hashemites an expansive postwar Arab kingdom, and the
Balfour Declaration (1917) that promised the Jewish people a homeland
in Palestine.
This version of history places the blame for the tensions and violence
of the region on the British and, by extension, the Zionists in Palestine
whom the British allegedly favored to serve as their colonial agents.
By creating artificial borders and working with questionable rulers, the
British and French left the region too fractured and unstable to deal
with the problems of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.
Photographs of Islamic State bulldozers eradicating the Sykes-Picot
borders graphically show the self-styled Caliphate erasing a shameful
past imposed by foreign interference.
The book’s thesis that World War I alone is not responsible for the
region’s many problems is certainly a valid and welcome one. JewishArab tensions, the Sunni-Shia rivalry, and frustrations that bubbled up
in the Arab Spring may have root causes dating to the war, but a great
deal happened both before and since. Johnson, therefore, makes an
important argument in trying to return agency to the Arabs themselves,
riven as they were by internal rivalries, differing attitudes toward the
British, and an inability to compromise.
Johnson outlines his thesis logically and reasonably in a solidly argued
introduction. Having served in the British army in the Middle East, he
has a sense of both the continuity and change in the region’s endemic
confl icts since 1914. He argues that the British came to the Middle East
without a clearly articulated strategy to replace the Ottomans. Indeed,
it had been British policy until 1915 to keep the Ottoman Empire
intact as a bulwark against Russian expansion into the Dardanelles and
central Asia. British policy evolved as the war progressed and as various
elements of the British government in London, Cairo, and New Delhi,
as well as in the field, contended for control.
The remainder of the book, however, is a fairly conventional account
of the war in the Middle East, seen almost exclusively from the British
perspective. The first chapter is mainly tangential to the arguments so
well articulated in the introduction, dealing with the nature of strategy
as seen from London in the years immediately prior to the war. The
remaining chapters largely follow the major British campaigns from
Sinai to Gallipoli to Mesopotamia.
Readers interested in the Gallipoli Campaign will note Johnson’s
much more sanguine assessment of an effort usually seen as an
unmitigated disaster. While acknowledging the campaign’s futility on the
operational and tactical levels, he defends Gallipoli as a strategic success,
relieving pressure on Russia and altering the strategic environment
in Mesopotamia and elsewhere on the Ottoman periphery. He is
similarly sanguine about the strategic value of Britain’s costly advance
in Mesopotamia in 1917–18. In both cases, he cites the British need
to maintain prestige in the face of its millions of Muslim citizens in
India. More depth on this topic would have solidified this part of
Johnson’s argument.
Specialists will not find much new information in The Great War
& the Middle East. The book reads best as a survey of major British
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campaigns in the region. Johnson recognizes the global context of the
war, with decisions made in Russia, the United States, and France all
playing key roles in the outcome of the war in the Middle East. He
also understands how to employ the standard ends, ways, and means
approach to the evaluation of strategy, although he discusses operations
and tactics much more often than the subtitle suggests. While the book
does not quite reach the potential of its introduction, it does provide a
solid military history on a part of the world where the embers of 1914–18
have yet to cool.

“A Delicate Aﬀair” on the Western Front: America Learns
How to Fight a Modern War in the Woëvre Trenches
By Terrence J. Finnegan
Reviewed by Greg Pickell, LTC, US Army (Ret.)
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great deal has been written about the entry of the United
States into the latter stages of the First World War. All too
often, this coverage takes the form of high-level histories or narrative descriptions of well-known actions like Belleau Wood or
Meuse-Argonne. These books are sometimes described as coffee
table decorations. “A Delicate Affair” is not one of those books. This
meticulously researched history of one of the very first US combat
actions on the Western Front succeeds in getting below the over-done
high-level narrative and “into the trenches.” Author Terrence Finnegan
helps readers understand the nightmarish complexity and daunting
challenges involved in trench warfare in a way seldom matched in other
works on the subject. Hauntingly, his detailed assessment also looks
in great detail at the German approach to the action. In doing so, he
provides discerning readers much of the conceptual blueprint for the
German blitzkrieg seen 22 years later.
A Delicate Affair chronicles the experiences of the US 26th “Yankee”
Division as it entered the trenches near the destroyed village of
Seicheprey in mid-April 1918. The event was significant. Although other
American units entered the trenches before them, the 26th Division was
to encounter the first planned German attack specifically focused on
testing the mettle of the newly arrived American troops.
Not surprisingly, subsequent events were not kind to the 26th, which
was soundly beaten during the course of the engagement. Employing the
fruits of years of experience and refined tactics, the assaulting German
force succeeded in breaking through the lines on a relatively wide front
while taking almost 200 prisoners. Indeed, what the Americans later
thought was their success in halting the drive and forcing the Germans
back was really little more than a planned German withdrawal following
a successful large-scale raid.
The narrative of the 26th aside, A Delicate Affair is a significant
addition to the body of knowledge on World War I for several reasons.
First, the book succeeds in conveying the incredible complexity involved
in the movement and activity of any large body of troops. Finnegan then
multiplies this challenge by discussing in detail the activities of the 26th
before and during the battle. In the end, it becomes clear the myriad of
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actions required to employ the men of the 26th effectively was beyond
the capability of the inexperienced leadership at the time—and perhaps
beyond the means of any army faced with the challenges that confronted
the newly arriving Americans.
A second important point made by the author lies in the
effective working relationship enjoyed by the Americans and their
French counterparts. While the French may not have learned the lessons
of trench warfare as comprehensively as their German foes, they had
in fact made significant strides, and these lessons were passed on to
members of the 26th Division. Cooperation between US and French
leaders was similarly close, and stands in significant contrast to the
experiences of other American formations as well as the senior US
leadership. The close working relationship enjoyed by the soldiers and
leaders of the Yankee Division and their French hosts likely prevented
the Americans’ baptism of fire from being even more painful.
Perhaps the most interesting part of A Delicate Affair lies in its
presentation of the planning and execution of the attack from the
German perspective. Of all the major combatants in the First World
War, the German army proved to be the most adaptable, and their attack
at Seicheprey employed four years of hard-earned experience. Their
tactical use of artillery and mortars in synchronization with assaulting
infantry provides a model that remains valid even today. More
important was the Germans’ use of infiltration tactics. This technique,
in which attacking units flowed around and past centers of resistance to
achieve dislocation of the defense, can be directly linked to the blitzkrieg
tactics used by the German Wehrmacht in the opening stages of the
Second World War more than two decades later. This approach, often
overlooked by historians due to the differences in speed and scale
involved in infantry versus mechanized movements, was completely
missed by the French during this period.
A Delicate Affair is what a serious history should be—detailed,
comprehensive, and capable of providing answers to root-cause questions
that rarely see the light of day. The story of the 26th and the aftermath of
the battle may not be the most inspirational ever written, but that is not
the point. War is truly hell, and this book is ironically and appropriately
less than delicate in making that point. Exhaustively documented with
an extensive array of maps, tactical diagrams, and technical data, A
Delicate Affair is essential reading for leaders seeking a real understanding
of World War I in the trenches and the US entry into that fateful confl ict.
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America Inc.? Innovation and Enterprise
in the National Security State
By Linda Weiss
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merica Inc.?: Innovation and Enterprise in the National Security State is an
important, thought-provoking book that deserves careful attention
from both military and civilian strategic-level national security professionals. Dr. Linda Weiss, professor emeritus of comparative politics at
the University of Sydney, offers a rich, fascinating, and accessible analysis
of one of the most important aspects of American national security
prowess—leadership in technological innovation. The implications of
her analysis are far-reaching. Reading her book will be especially valuable
to anyone engaged in the enterprises of defense management, research,
capabilities development, and acquisition.
Weiss argues America’s extraordinary success in technological
innovation since World War II presents a puzzle other analysts have
not adequately explained. In her book, she explores why the United
States has been so successful in leading technological innovation for
an extended period of history, masterfully weaving together an analysis
of US political economy and national security that describes American
success since World War II, explains the emergence of various techniques
of state and market interplay that produced this success, and speculates
about future US prospects to sustain such an impressive record.
Her analysis starts with a major contrast. The United States did not
lead technological innovation, particularly in the military realm, by any
appreciable margin before World War II. In contrast, since World War
II the United States has led technological innovation, often by wide
margins, in the areas of atomic energy, missile technology, computers,
antibacterial drugs, the Internet, the Global Positioning System,
semiconductors, microwave technology, lasers, and jet aircraft. These
and many other innovations have been valuable for security and, in
many cases, have delivered significant ancillary benefits to society. So,
why has the United States been more successful since World War II?
Weiss identifies two prominent explanations common in national
security literature that she then challenges. One explanation identifies
innovation as a function of the hidden hand of free market capitalism.
The other finds the strong hand of government guiding defense spending
as a form of national industrial policy. Her close scrutiny demonstrates
neither explanation is sufficient, and her more compelling explanation,
which she terms “hybridization,” runs between:
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America’s propensity for radical innovation is not a ‘stateless’ story and freemarket capitalism is not how the United States achieved high-technology
leadership. Through an extensive array of public-private alliances and innovation hybrids, technology development programs and investment funds,
the United States has created not a liberal, but a hybrid political economy—
one that is shaped by a national security state deeply entwined with the
commercial sector.” (195)

The hybridization explanation offers a useful way to consider the
potential for continued American success and highlights potential
obstacles more clearly. Weiss shows there is no way to explain American
technological innovation without attention to the catalytic role of the
government and, in particular, the wide-ranging combination of national
government entities she terms the “National Security State” or NSS.
The NSS role is especially significant in the early, high-risk stages of
innovation. It is also important to note other key players in the NSS, in
addition to the Department of Defense and the intelligence community,
include the Department of Energy (with nuclear power and weapons),
the National Institutes of Health, the National Science Foundation, and
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
American technological innovation benefitted from an array of
national laboratories, higher education institutions, and corporations, as
well as from a permissive regulatory environment that allowed innovators
to benefit from commercial incentives. Examples of key
players include universities such as Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, Stanford, Caltech, Carnegie Mellon, and Chicago;
federally funded research and development centers such as the
Los Alamos National Lab, the Oak Ridge National Laboratory,
the Sandia National Laboratories, the Lincoln Laboratory, and the
Mitre Corporation; and venture capital investment entities such as
the Small Business Investment Company (sponsored by the Small
Business Administration) and In-Q-Tel (sponsored by the Central
Intelligence Agency).
Looking forward, Weiss suggests there is little time for the United
States to rest on its laurels. Potential competitors are narrowing the
gap in technological capabilities. Her cautionary conclusion suggests
a pair of political and economic factors could impede continued US
technological innovation (such as the ongoing efforts of the third offset
strategy). One factor is a hyperpartisan domestic political environment
that may well sunder the bipartisan support that has permitted the
success of hybridization (particularly the effective role the state has
played in underwriting risk in the name of long-term potential gains)
and an economic system fixated on “financialism” that places short-term
gains at such a premium that innovative advancements are less likely to
flourish at the hands of the market alone.
America Inc.? is not an easy read, but it is nonetheless very accessible.
Weiss builds her complex argument carefully and steps readers through
it with a steady hand. The political economy of technical innovation is
generally not a story of dramatic events and catalytic moments (although
the sense of alarm and the subsequent response to the 1957 Soviet launch
of Sputnik is a major exception). Rather, the main story line is about
the accretion of choices over decades by many actors and agencies
navigating partisan politics and American culture. The argument is
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important and nuanced. The overarching history and associated vignettes
are fascinating and well chosen. Weiss brings the wisdom derived from
decades of study to a complex subject with great force.
The author’s argument is an important one for the United States
and its allies. Liberal civil society and its complex architecture are often
strained in times of crisis by the requirements of national defense. The
United States and Great Britain before it have been able to withstand such
pressures because of their abilities to find a firebreak, if you will, that
limits the magnitude of resource mobilization to counter adversaries.
High defense resource demands can be a powerful excuse for clamping
down on the inefficiencies and chaotic domestic confl icts at the heart
of pluralist, liberal democratic polities and free market economics. For
Britain, the most dramatic of firebreaks was the use of a limited portion
of its population and resources to build and operate the wooden walls of
the Royal Navy that could exploit the geographic advantages of its island
location. Similarly, the maintenance of military capabilities strongly
enabled by cutting-edge technologies has allowed the United States to
limit its resources and the portion of its population devoted to national
security. But as threats mount and geography shrinks, the costs of
maintaining an effective qualitative advantage become more daunting.
America Inc.? provides trenchant analysis and raises important
questions for policymakers and national security professionals to
contemplate in linking technological innovation to national security.
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P

opular literature has focused on creative individuals (Walter
Isaacson’s Innovators, 2015) and innovative organizations (Schmidt
and Rosenberg’s How Google Works, 2014) in attempts to discern key
traits, processes, and cultures that produce the “secret sauce” and lead
to success. At the heart of this success is the ability of individuals and
organizations to develop and exploit new technologies with phenomenal
results. At a higher level of analysis, scholars seek to discern the factors
and conditions among nations that support growth in science and technology. Arguably, science and technology fuel the engines of national
economies and are linked inextricably to security interests.
One such scholar is Mark Zachary Taylor, a political scientist with a
doctorate from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. His continued
interest in technology and the behavior of nations has resulted in several
publications on national innovation and political economy—the latest is
The Politics of Innovation. An associate professor of international affairs at
Georgia Institute of Technology, Taylor is well equipped to determine
“why some countries are better at science and technology.”
Taylor is intrigued by the analysis of British historian Donald
Cardwell which led to Cardwell’s Law: “no nation has been very creative
for more than a historically short period. Fortunately, as each leader has
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flagged, there has always been, up to now, a nation or nations to take
over the torch” (3). Thus, in The Politics of Innovation, Taylor examines
historical and regional cases of nation-states to test the law and in doing
so uncovers his insights. The introductory chapter includes a section,
“The American Imperative,” that demonstrates the applicability of
Cardwell’s Law to the United States. An obvious inference is the
United States is faltering as a leader in innovation and must therefore
understand the critical contributing factors in order to regain and sustain
its global leadership.
Taylor presents a comprehensive and systematic analysis of
international innovation practices, results, and trends. He provides a
series of definitions for often-used terms in science, technology, and
innovation that enable the use of frameworks and accepted metrics for
his wide-ranging examination. One framework is the “five pillars” of
innovation—“intellectual property rights, research subsidies, education,
research universities, and trade policies” (74)—he uses to scrutinize the
performance of countries. In chapter 5, “Why Nations Fail,” and in
chapter 6, “How Nations Succeed,” Taylor finds, “domestic institutions
and policies do not determine the rate and direction of national inventive
activities . . . institutions and policies do influence outcomes, but are not,
causal factors” (139) and “successful science and technology states are
typified by international networks of trade, finance, production, knowledge,
and human-capital flows that play important roles in determining
national innovation rates” (178). He also concludes that domestic policies
seeking to encourage innovation may have a paradoxical effect of
impeding it because of stakeholder resistance; therefore, governmental
intervention is necessary to sustain the effort. A major portion of the
book focuses on how nations innovate through the use of institutions,
policies, and networks. In the end, the interplay of political agendas
among powerful members within a society has the greatest impact on
national innovation performance.
Taylor introduces the concept of “creative insecurity” to propose
why nations innovate. Creative insecurity is “the positive difference
between the threats of economic or military competition from abroad
and the dangers of political-economic rivalries at home” (13). Taylor’s
analysis confirms the use of external threats as the impetus for nationallevel innovation in both the economic and military domains. While he
does not name the military-industrial complex as a major driver and
benefactor of research-and-development and science-and-technology
programs, he provides several cases where defense funding is viewed as
investments that generate innovation spin-offs for civilian use. Because
of the potential consequences of state-on-state confl ict, he cautions
against constructing and contriving external threats for the purpose of
creating growth in innovation.
In the United States of the twenty-first century, we have had several
calls to pursue science, technology, engineering, and mathematics as
education policy and to invest in research and development through
economic and defense policies aimed at securing national-level interests.
In a November 2014 memorandum, then-US Secretary of Defense
Chuck Hagel announced the Defense Innovation Initiative, a major
component in the development of the Department of Defense Third
Offset Strategy. The initiative’s charter is to “pursue innovative ways
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to sustain and advance our military superiority for the 21st century and
improve business operations throughout the Department.” Hagel closed
the memo with: “America’s continued strategic dominance will rely on
innovation and adaptability across our defense enterprise.” For this
reviewer, Taylor’s caution about threat narratives rings true—witness
current concerns about the emerging power of China, the resurgence
of Russia, and the recurring call to regain technological overmatch over
potential adversaries.
Parameters readers will be interested in the four-page section “Military
Resistance to Innovation” where Taylor asserts:
“Innovation is threatening to military personnel because changes to their
technology can sometimes demand changes to long-established strategic
doctrines, battlefield tactics, or bureaucratic organizations. Military advancement is built on these things . . . new military technologies can privilege one
branch or mission over another, thereby triggering interservice or intraservice rivalries.” (191)

We have seen the introduction of new technologies (e.g., stealth,
precision-guided munitions, sensors, cyber, etc.) that have shaped new
strategic and operational concepts—and met resistance from many
within the US military.
Taylor’s work is well researched, enlightening, and a worthy
read. His major contribution offers the lens of political science to the
strategic choices nations make in search of competitive advantage in
the global environment. National security professionals will recognize
this book is about the interaction among the instruments of national
power—diplomatic, information, military, and economic—and thus
the innovation performance of nations is based ultimately on political
decisions. Whether Cardwell’s Law will hold for the United States
remains to be seen.
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ublic discourse about unmanned aerial systems—drones,
colloquially—has proliferated in years past, yet scholarly literature
on the topic has only recently begun to accumulate. In Sudden Justice:
America’s Secret Drone Wars, Chris Woods documents and assesses the use
of armed drones by the United States (and in some cases its close allies).
It is unclear whether the goal of the book is to serve as a thorough
historical record or a comprehensive policy prescription. Unfortunately,
the book does neither completely. The disjointed chapters largely record
the increasing utilization of drones for kinetic missions since 2001
in both Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as missions further afield in
Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen. Interspersed amongst these fragmented
vignettes are underdeveloped ruminations on the legal and moral
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implications of using the technology in asymmetric warfare to combat
nontraditional enemies.
I hoped to be impressed by the book; however, I was generally
underwhelmed by its lack of a nuanced understanding of both the
individual players as well as the broader game. Coming from the
unmanned industry perspective, Sudden Justice presents a superficial
overview of drone applications. For example, the widely accepted
military parlance for drones is less alarmist and articulates what
they are—unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which are the
aircraft platforms used as part of a larger unmanned aerial system (UAS),
which may be comprised of multiple UAVs, as well as a ground control
system, and other launch/recovery equipment or communications
devices. The heavy reliance on the word drone triggers visions of
nightly news reporting on tragic deaths and their categorization as
“collateral damage.”
Adding to the sensationalist tone are myriad anecdotes that capture
retrospective criticisms of military and intelligence professionals about
lessons learned in the early years of UAS operations. As in any application
of new technology in a complex environment, there were many lessons
learned from successes, failures, and after-action reports, which form
today’s best practices in the field of UAS operations. Historically,
these lessons are important to record in this book. Practically, their
presentation comes across as condescending criticisms, implying those
responsible should have known better or acted otherwise.
Another perspective I found imbalanced was the chapter titled
“Game Face On: The Intimacy of Remote Killing.” While Woods
presents the issue of killing from afar as a new phenomenon that mental
health professionals are struggling to deal with alongside the operator
(remote pilot) community, it could instead be compared against the
literature on the psychological experiences of sniper teams—“eyes from
a hide” versus “eyes from the sky” (all the more relevant given the author
referred to an unmanned aircraft as an “aerial sniper rifle”).
In addition to melodramatic tone and word choices, there are also
basic factual discrepancies, such as Woods’s reference to the College of
William & Mary as “William and Mary University.” Furthermore, at
multiple points, Woods muddies the terminology and responsibilities of
US Special Forces (a distinct component of the US Army) with broader
US Special Operations Forces, while littering the book with superficial
and misleading assessments of well-documented, elite military elements,
making me question the depth of his understanding about these topics.
There are also instances where the relationship between quotes and their
endnote citations lacked context or clarity of intent, thus presenting an
opportunity for misinterpretation.
Woods also focuses on and criticizes kinetic applications, rather than
balancing his commentary with equally in-depth accounting of their
vast use as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) gathering
platforms. While I respect Woods’s background and journalistic bona
fides, he bounces back and forth between praising drone technology as
“the most precise weapon in the history of warfare” and highlighting
failures of the precision and efficacy of drone strikes in the early years
of the technology’s use.
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If Woods’s intent for the book was to issue a call for public demand
of increased government accountability and military procedural
transparency, then he hit his mark. But he could have done so to a
wider audience in an op-ed piece rather than a book. If his intent was
to document the history of increased reliance on, and preference
for, UAS capabilities, then he would have done well to pick up
where Richard Whittle’s Predator: The Secret Origins of the Drone
Revolution left off. As-is, the book comes across as a disjointed
historical record with an inconsistent mix of condemnation and praise
of the technology’s capabilities.
Is the topic of drone strikes interesting? Yes. Is increased discourse
about this public policy issue both important and appropriate? Yes. Does
Sudden Justice offer both breadth and depth sufficient to be considered
an authoritative source to inform all aspects of such discussions? No.
Readers may walk away better informed about relevant issues in a general
sense, but without a comprehensive understanding and coherent policy
perspective on the myriad capabilities of this technology—both kinetic
and otherwise—to improve the warfighting advantage for the United
States and its allies.
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n Exploiting Africa, Donovan Chau examines China’s relations with
Algeria, Ghana, and Tanzania from the 1950s to the 1970s. He claims
China’s current official African policy is reminiscent of past Maoist-era
policies (148) and the policy is largely based on China’s identification as
a member of the developing world, or Global South, tied to the African
continent by a common sense of historic neglect and subjugation by
imperialist forces. Chau believes China’s African foreign policy is a “longterm, pragmatic behavior from the very beginning on the continent”
(148)—in other words, China’s policy has been strictly “über-realist.”
Viewed from historic and strategic perspectives, China’s current presence
demonstrates continuity with the past rather than a renewed focus in the
present or an altered direction for the future (3).
According to Chau, China’s rapprochement toward the African
continent from the 1950s to the 1970s, much like its twenty-first-century
foreign policy, demonstrated China’s desire to achieve superpower status
through a primary strategy of resource acquisition. To accomplish this
objective, China’s diplomatic relations with Algeria, Ghana, and Tanzania
“used a mix of international political support, tangible development aid,
and economic and security assistance, both covert and overt” (4). Given
China’s central objective of attaining superpower status, Africa, with its
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abundance of natural and mineral resources, fit squarely into China’s
long-term plans and appetite for industrial development.
In addition to traditional means of diplomacy such as trade,
commerce, bilateral agreements, and the military, China used
domestic and international organizations to advance its political,
military, and strategic relations (22). While these government and
nongovernmental organizations varied from region to region, they
affected tangibly the targeted individuals and organizations (32). The
New China News Agency collected and disseminated news at home
and abroad (22–23) and was strategically located in countries and
regions around the world at a time when China did not maintain
official diplomatic relations with many nation-states (23). Another
important organization, the Commission for the Cultural Relations
with Foreign Countries, performed intelligence work and sponsored the
exchange of cultural and scientific delegations. Finally, the Afro-Asian
People’s Solidarity Organization, promoted solidarity among African
and Asian peoples; however, its true objective was to promote anticolonialism and anti-imperialism, both of which were secondary
objectives of Communist China (29).
Through three detailed case studies, Chau reviews China’s presence
in Africa, beginning in 1958 when China became the first country to
establish official diplomatic relations with the Provisional Government
of the Algerian Republic after its formation by Ferhat Abbas (44).
While China provided the newly independent Algeria with economic
and military aid, the Chinese used Algeria as a platform for a political
message of developing world and international unity (68).
Next, Chau describes China’s penetration of Tanzania as a smooth
process due to newly elected Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere.
Diplomatic relations, established in 1962 when China opened its
embassy in the capital Dar es Salaam, were rooted in shared imperial
and colonial experiences. To further cement their relationship, China
and Tanzania in 1965 signed a treaty of friendship and released a joint
communique in which Nyerere reaffirmed Tanzania’s commitment to
Communist China as the only representative of the Chinese people.
China’s multidimensional activities in Tanzania included political,
development, and security projects, including the construction of the
Tanzania-Zambia Railway Authority rail line.
Finally, Chau shows how China’s early attempts to establish
diplomatic relations with Ghana after its independence in 1957 faced
opposition from President Kwame Nkrumah. For Nkrumah, it was
necessary to “search for African unity” (77) before establishing
diplomatic relations. Ghana finally recognized Communist China as a
sovereign independent state in July 1960, the second African country to
do so. As Chau points out, given Nkrumah’s political ideology emulated
the thinking of China’s Mao Zedong, Ghana became China’s base of
revolutionary operations “focused mainly on the training and arming
of African fighters” (91). Cozy diplomatic relations came to an end in
February 1966 when a military coup d’état ousted Nkrumah. China and
Ghana did not reestablish diplomatic relations until 1972.
In the twenty-first century, China is attempting to ascend to its
rightful place among the world’s superpowers by securing its economic
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needs—an ascendancy which began with the pragmatic moderates
who came to power under Deng Xiaoping and the establishment of
China’s special economic zones. Political commentators and pundits
assume China is pursuing a realist foreign policy, however, as Chau
shows, “today China is actively seeking opportunities of influence on
the continent [of Africa] by using the same general strategic approach
as it did in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s” (148). While China’s actions
in world affairs are still driven by revolutionary ideals, Chinese leaders
prioritize strategic objectives over ideological pursuits. China wants to
offer the world an alternative to the Washington Consensus with its
strict laundry list of rules, regulations, and obligations that are imposed
upon the developing world. Instead, the Beijing Consensus does not care
what kind of government or leadership a nation-state embraces as long
as the nation-state is willing to trade with China and recognize there is
only one China representative of the Chinese people.
Exploiting Africa makes a valuable contribution to understanding
China’s past involvement and continued presence in Africa. I highly
recommend this book to readers interested in world politics, international
affairs, and political science—and, most importantly, to current and
future military leaders.

The Crisis of the African State: Globalization, Tribalism,
and Jihadism in the Twenty-First Century
Edited by Anthony N. Celso and Robert Nalbandov
Reviewed by LTC (P) Jason B. Nicholson, Foreign Area Oﬃcer for Sub-Saharan
Africa

Quantico, VA: Marine
Corps University Press,
2016
239 pages
Free

I

n The Crisis of the African State: Globalization, Tribalism, and Jihadism in the
Twenty-First Century, editors Anthony N. Celso and Robert Nalbandov
present select case studies on contemporary African security issues.
Bringing together scholars and practitioners, this volume specifically
addresses the types of problems most likely to involve the United States
and its allies and partners—either directly or indirectly. Broadly organized into three sections, the book’s eight chapters explore the challenges
faced by African states posed by modernity, ethnic conflict, and violent
Islamic extremism.
The first section considers the impacts and opportunities offered by
the Arab Spring for northwest African jihadist movements. In chapter
one, Daveed Gartenstein-Ross explores Tunisia’s hesitant policy of
accommodation and confrontation with extremists that facilitated their
ability to survive and expand operationally following the collapse of
the regime led by dictator Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali. In chapters two and
three, both Celso and Henri Boré examine the French-led intervention
to drive al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and its allies out of northern
Mali in 2013 and suggest how this confl ict informed potential future
regional counterterrorism operations.
The second section evaluates civil wars and the transition from rebel
groups to government. Reviewing the Eritrean, Ethiopian, and Rwandan
civil wars in chapter four, Ian S. Spears describes how victorious rebel
factions consolidated and legitimized their rule. In chapter five, Robert
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E. Gribbin analyzes the Rwandan genocide’s myriad effects upon society
and the government’s response to those challenges in the first five years
after the killing stopped. France and Libya’s interventions in Chad
from the 1960s to the 1990s are examined by Nalbandov in chapter six,
demonstrating the role of confl ict continuation and peacemaking failure
as by-products of external power proxy confl icts during civil war.
The last section highlights the cumulative consequences of the social,
political, and security problems identified in the earlier sections. Clarence
J. Bouchat discusses Nigeria as a microcosm of the structural challenges
facing African states in their attempts to provide legitimate and peaceful
means of political confl ict resolution for their often highly diverse
populations. The summary chapter by Celso and Nalbandov suggests
that while Africa’s political problems are substantial, the singular case
studies demonstrate successful solutions are possible if domestic political
elites create functional institutions to allocate resources equitably,
protect minorities, and govern legitimately.
The political processes discussed throughout the book, such as
modernization and democratization, imply winning and losing as
outcomes. Identity formation through nationalism is often accompanied
by ethnic cleansing and violence to establish in- and out-group identities
upon which to base societal resource distribution resulting from greater
productivity. Political development of the nation-state is deeply shaped
by the effects of industrialization upon identity construction. War,
particularly ethnic confl icts in nonindustrialized societies, also plays a
causal role in identity formation.
These themes make further study of African political dynamics
relevant because they are directly related to the authors’ discussions
of globalization, tribalism, and jihadism. The “fourth wave” of
democratization accompanying the collapse of the Soviet Union and
its satellites may now be superseded by a “fifth wave.” Some of the last
Cold War regimes are in Africa (Tunisia and Egypt) and the Middle East
(Iraq and Syria). The political forces present in these states apart have
also been slowly emerging in sub-Saharan Africa where other remaining
Cold War vestigial regimes continue to exist.
Contemporary confl icts in the Middle East have assumed an ethnic
dimension suggestive of the forces of nationalism and identity formation.
The political unraveling of the Cold War order in the Balkans during
the fourth wave of democratization also resulted in highly destructive
ethnic confl icts. Political, defense, and security policymakers should
read The Crisis of the African State as indicative of the problems confronting
weak states that govern ethnically diverse populations in Africa. These
challenges possess the potential to activate populations politically in ways
they have not been mobilized previously. Understanding the root causes
of such confl icts facilitates addressing them now through sustained
engagement with African nations to develop legitimate, representative,
and democratic institutions that can withstand the strains imposed by
inevitable further development of the continent.

